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UNIFORM PATENT LITIGATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
VIABILITY OF RECENT PROPOSALS AIMED  
AT UNIFYING THE EUROPEAN PATENT 
LITIGATION SYSTEM 
The European patent system has undergone many significant changes
1
 
since international intellectual property rights were first recognized among 
European countries in 1883.
2
 While many of these changes have reduced 
the costs associated with obtaining patent rights throughout Europe,
3
 none 
of the changes have successfully addressed one of the biggest problems 
still plaguing the European patent system today: inefficient and 
fragmented patent litigation.
4
 In recent years, the European Union and the 
European Patent Organization have made several proposals to resolve 
these issues.
5
 None of these proposals, however, have been successful,
6
 
and recent opinions expressed by the Advocates General of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union suggest that these proposals, in their current form, are destined to 
fail.
7
 This Note assesses the viability of the recent proposals to reform the 
patent system aimed at unifying patent litigation throughout Europe and 
suggests that an agreement between the members of the European Patent 
Organization is the most efficient solution.   
 
 
 1. See, e.g., DOMINIQUE GUELLEC & BRUNO VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, THE 
ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM: IP POLICY FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 25–
26 (2007) (summarizing significant developments since the late nineteenth century). 
 2. See id. at 25 (―The first outcome [of the international exposition of Vienna in 1873] was the 
Paris Convention of 1883, initially signed by 10 countries (Belgium, France, Guatemala, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, San Salvador, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland).‖).  
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 221–22.  
 5. See infra Part III; see also James Forrester, James Killick & Anthony Dawes, Obstacle to the 
Creation of EU-Wide Patent Court, http://www.bnai.com/EUWidePatentCourt/default.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2012) (providing brief summary of the different attempts by different European bodies to 
reform the patent system). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Press Release, The Draft Agreement on the Creation of a European and Community 
Patent Court is Not Compatible with European Union Law (Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://curia 
.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-03/cp110017en.pdf (summarizing reasons as to why 
proposals were incompatible with current European Union Law). 
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I. HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 
To understand the nature of the current problems with patent litigation 
in the European Union, one must first understand the historical framework 
of the European patent system. The Paris Convention of 1883
8
 was one of 
the earliest international agreements on intellectual property rights.
9
 
Although patent law was not the main focus of the Paris Convention,
10
 the 
resulting international relationships set the stage for future cooperation in 
developing a European patent system.
11
  
Aside from international cooperation, two notable results grew out of 
the Paris Convention of 1883. First, the Paris Convention introduced the 
principle of national treatment: citizens of a signatory state would receive 
the same protection in a foreign country as the foreign country’s citizens.12 
Second, the Paris Convention presented the notion of ―priority 
application‖—where an applicant can use the application date in one 
country to establish priority in other signatory states to the Paris 
Convention if the applicant files in the other countries within a specified 
time period.
13
 These two principles were seen as imperative to reliable 
international intellectual property protection.
14
  
The Paris Convention of 1883 has been amended six times since its 
inception,
15
 granting more protection with each revision.
16
 However, the 
 
 
 8. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last revised at the Stockholm 
Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583; 828 U.N.T.S. 303. 
 9. GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 11 (1992). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Michael LaFlame, Jr., The European Patent System: An Overview and Critique, 32 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 605, 608 (2010) (citing PATERSON, supra note 9, at 11) The Paris Convention is the first 
instance of international cooperation in patent law. Id. at 609. The ten original signatory countries of 
the Paris Convention were Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. 
GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 25. The United Kingdom and 
Germany subsequently acceded to the Paris Convention in 1884 and 1903, respectively. Id. 
 12. Robin Cowan, Wim Van der Euk, Francesco Lissoni, Peter Lotz, Geertrui Van Overwalle & 
Jens Schovsbo, Policy Options for the Improvement of the European Patent System, IP/A/STOA/ 
ST/2006-020 at 6 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1720086. 
The principle of national treatment has its foundation in what is today known as the telle quelle 
(French for ―as is‖) provision of the Paris Convention, which provides that foreign citizens of any 
signatory country shall be treated the same way as nationals. See id.; Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, art. 6quinquies 
§ A(1), July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583; 828 U.N.T.S. 303. 
 13. GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 25. The time period was 
originally six months, later amended to be one year. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. LaFlame, supra note 11, at 609. 
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Paris Convention has not been revised since 1967.
17
 In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (and even as early as 1959),
18
 various countries and 
international communities discussed several new international agreements 
on intellectual property rights.
19
 These new discussions generated new 
international agreements, making amendments to the Paris Convention 
unnecessary.  
The first treaty resulting from these talks was the Strasbourg 
Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on 
Patents for Invention (―Strasbourg Convention‖), signed in 1963.20 The 
Strasbourg Convention was the result of discussions within the Council of 
Europe.
21
 The main purpose of the Strasbourg Convention was to create 
uniform procedural and substantive requirements for obtaining patent 
rights throughout Europe,
22
 which were to be applied by the national 
courts of the Convention’s member states.23 
At the conclusion of the Strasbourg Convention, European nations 
were also discussing the possibility of not only a uniform procedure for 
granting patents, but also a centralized granting procedure for all European 
nations.
24
 The Council of Europe recommended the creation of a European 
 
 
 17. GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 25. 
 18. Id. at 25, 27. 
 19. John B. Pegram, An American View of the Patent System in Europe in 2009, 91 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 594, 595 (2009). Interestingly, it was during these discussions in the late 
1960s and early 1970s that the idea of a uniform patent litigation system was first introduced (albeit in 
the form of a community patent). Id. 
 20. GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 27. Although the 
Strasbourg Convention was signed in 1963, it did not enter into force until August 1, 1980. The 
Council of Europe Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for 
Invention, opened for signature Nov. 11, 1963, C.E.T.S. No. 047 (1980), http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=047&CM=8&DF=12/10/04&CL=ENG (last visited Apr. 13, 
2012). 
 21. GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 27. The Council of 
Europe, established in 1949, is an international organization distinct from the European Union. 
Council of Europe in Brief, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/default.asp (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2011). The Council of Europe, originally founded by ten European countries, now consists of 
47 European countries. Id. The goal of the Council of Europe is focused on preserving human rights 
and democracy throughout Europe. Id. 
 22. LaFlame, supra note 11, at 611.  
 23. Id. Outside of Europe, the Patent Cooperation Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C. on 
June 19, 1970. GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 26, 156. Under the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty, a patent applicant can file an application with the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (―WIPO‖) and designate in which countries he or she would like to later 
validate the patent once the patent applicant’s home country has granted the patent. Id. at 26. 
 24. Id. at 27. The Strasbourg Convention simply created uniform procedural and substantive 
requirements that would be applied by the national courts of each country that was a member of the 
Strasbourg Convention. Id. The idea behind a European Patent Office was to provide a centralized 
body that would apply these requirements in issuing patents, although the resulting patents would still 
technically be issued by the individual nations. Id.  
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Patent Office, a centralized body with a unitary procedure for acquiring 
patent rights throughout Europe.
25
 To achieve this objective, the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents (―European Patent 
Convention‖),26 took place between September 5 and October 5, 1973.27 
The main purpose of the European Patent Convention was to establish a 
single, centralized procedure for the granting of patents throughout 
Europe.
28
 The European Patent Convention established the European 
Patent Office,
29
 which became the executive body and ―operating arm‖30 
of the European Patent Organization.
31
  
The European Patent Organization is not an ―organ‖ of, nor is it legally 
bound by, the European Union.
32
 Rather, it is a stand-alone organization 
governed by an administrative body consisting of representatives of the 
European Patent Convention member states.
33
 The task of the European 
Patent Organization is to grant ―European patents,‖34 which are carried out 
by the European Patent Office.
35
 A European patent has the same effect in 
each member country as it would if it were a national patent granted by 
that country.
36
 Thus, the European Patent Convention provided a ―unitary 
application and examination procedure resulting in the grant of a bundle of 
 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter 
European Patent Convention]. 
 27. R. Singer, The Future European Patent System: An Outline of the Main Elements of the 
System, in THE NEW EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 1, 5 (Seminar Servs. Int’l, 1976). 
 28. European Patent Convention, supra note 26, pmbl. The European Patent Convention was 
intended to complement the Patent Cooperation Treaty in terms of acquiring patent rights throughout 
Europe. See GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 27. According to 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, ―[t]he [European Patent Convention] was negotiated in 
parallel with the [Patent Cooperation Treaty], as countries wanted to ensure consistency between the 
two, and to make clear that the [European Patent Office] would be a major pillar of the emerging 
worldwide system.‖ Id. The Patent Cooperation Treaty and the European Patent Convention were also 
both implemented on the same day, June 1, 1978. Id. at 26. 
 29. GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 27. 
 30. Pegram, supra note 19, at 596. 
 31. Id. at 596; GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 27. 
 32. Pegram, supra note 19, at 596. 
 33. GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 27. When the European 
Patent Organization entered into force in 1977, only Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom were members. Member States of the European 
Patent Organization, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/about-us/organisation/member-
states.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2011). Today, the European Patent Organization has thirty-eight 
member states, including all of the European Union member states. Id.  
 34. European Patent Convention, supra note 26, art. 4(3). 
 35. Id. 
 36. The European Patent Convention provides, ―The European patent shall, in each of the 
Contracting States for which it is granted, have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a 
national patent granted by that State, unless otherwise provided in this Convention.‖ Id. art. 2(2). 
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national patents valid in countries selected by the patentee.‖37 Because 
European patents issued by the European Patent Office are treated as 
domestic patents in any member states, only the courts of the individual 
countries have the authority to enforce the rights of the patent holder.
38
 
The European Patent Office has no authority to hear infringement actions 
or enforce a patent-holder’s rights in any country.39 
As the conclusion of the European Patent Convention drew near, the 
then nine members of the European Union
40
 were aware of the European 
Patent Office’s limited ability to enforce patent-holders’ rights.41 The 
members of the European Union began discussing potential solutions to 
the problem, and one of the main topics of discussion was a community 
patent system for members of the European Union
42—the same goal as the 
proposals currently under consideration in the European Union.
43
 The 
discussions culminated in the signing of the Convention for the European 
Patent and Common Market (―Community Patent Convention‖) at the 
Luxembourg Conference in 1975.
44
 Many practitioners at that time 
believed that the Community Patent Convention, combined with the 
European Patent Convention, would establish a unified patent system for 
 
 
 37. GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 27. See also ANDREW 
RUDGE, GUIDE TO EUROPEAN PATENTS § 1.2 (2012) (―[W]hilst during the grant proceedings the 
application is unitary, on grant it fragments into a series of national patents. . . . This bundle of patents 
is largely indistinguishable from a set of national patents that have been granted independently by the 
national patent offices [of each individual country] . . . .‖). 
 38. European Patent Convention, supra note 26, art. 2(2); see also Stacey J. Farmer & Martin 
Grund, Revision of the European Patent Convention & Potential Impact on European Patent Practice, 
36 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 419, 423–24 (2008). 
 39. Farmer & Martin, supra note 38, at 423. The European Patent Office does retain some 
authority over patents once they are granted. Specifically, the European Patent Office has the authority 
to hear opposition proceedings. European Patent Convention, supra note 26, art. 99. Under recent 
amendments to the European Patent Convention, the European Patent Office also has the authority to 
hear limitation or revocation proceedings initiated by the patentee. See Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents (European Patent Convention), art. 105a, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (as 
amended Nov. 29, 2000) [hereinafter Amended European Patent Convention]. 
 40. At the time the European Patent Convention was signed (1973), the European Union was 
known as the European Community. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 
[hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. The term ―European Union‖ replaced the ―European Community‖ 
with the signing of the Treaty on European Union. Id. art. A. To avoid confusion throughout this Note, 
the term ―European Union‖ is used to refer to the European Community as it existed prior to 1992 as 
well as the European Union after its creation in 1992. In 1973, the European Union was comprised of 
nine member states—Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Singer, supra note 27, at 30. 
 41. Singer, supra note 27, at 30. 
 42. Pegram, supra note 19, at 595. 
 43. See infra Parts III.A, III.B. 
 44. Convention on the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975, 19 O.J. (L 17) 1 
(1976) [hereinafter Community Patent Convention]; see also Pegram, supra note 19, at 595–96. 
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both the granting of patents and the enforcement of patent-holders’ rights 
throughout the European Union,
45
 although this proposition is 
questionable.
46
 Even though the Community Patent Convention was a 
product of, and restricted to, members of the European Union,
47
 the 
Community Patent Convention was based on the European Patent 
Convention and only members of the European Patent Convention could 
be parties to the Community Patent Convention.
48
 Thus, only countries 
that were members of both the European Patent Convention and the 
European Union could accede to the Community Patent Convention.  
The Community Patent Convention called for patents granted by the 
European Patent Office to be ―unitary.‖49 This concept means a patent 
granted by the European Patent Office would receive the same treatment 
throughout the entire European Union.
50
 For example, if the patent were 
revoked or invalidated in one country, it would be revoked or invalidated 
with respect to all European Union countries.
51
 Additionally, the 
translation costs required by the Community Patent Convention likely 
would have been prohibitively costly.
52
 
 
 
 45. ―By concluding the European Patent Convention at the Munich Diplomatic Conference on 5 
October 1973, and by signing the Community Patent Convention in Luxembourg on 15 December 
1975 the fundamental principles of the future European [patent] system have been established.‖ K. 
Haertel, Introduction to THE NEW EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM (Seminar Servs. Int’l 1976). Haertel 
also makes reference to ―the new regulations [referring to the Community Patent Convention] on 
enforcement of rights in infringement proceedings effective throughout the territory of the [European 
Union].‖ Id. 
 46. Whether or not the Community Patent Convention would have achieved its ultimate purpose 
is questionable. Infringement proceedings under the Community Patent Convention would have been 
governed by the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement, Sept. 27, 1968. Singer, supra note 27, at 
40. This convention was in fact the predecessor of the modern day regulation governing jurisdiction 
and judgments throughout the European Union. Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 
2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Regulation]. As a result, the 1968 Convention 
contained provisions nearly identical to those contained in the Brussels Regulation. Thus, while the 
rights of the patent holder may have been ―unitary‖ throughout the European Union, enforcing these 
rights would likely have suffered from the same problems as those caused by the Brussels Regulation 
today. See discussion infra Part II. 
 47. Singer, supra note 27, at 30. The Community Patent Convention provided an exception for 
countries that were ―closely connected‖ to the European Union. Community Patent Convention, supra 
note 44, art. 96. 
 48. Singer, supra note 27, at 30. 
 49. Id. at 31. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. Despite being signed by all nine members of the European Union, the Community Patent 
Convention was never ratified because of political reasons. PATERSON, supra note 9, at 21. In order to 
take effect, the Community Patent Convention required all signatory states to ratify the convention. 
Singer, supra note 27, at 30. The United Kingdom failed to ratify the Community Patent Convention. 
PATERSON, supra note 9, at 21.  
 52. Pegram, supra note 19, at 596. In addition to translating the patent claims into English, 
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Ten years later, in 1985, after it was apparent the Community Patent 
Convention would not get unanimously ratified, the member states of the 
European Union met again in Luxembourg to attempt to implement the 
community patent system.
53
 This conference was essentially an attempt to 
revive the earlier Community Patent Convention, which the European 
Union failed to ratify.
54
 Although the new convention, the Agreement 
Relating to Community Patents,
55
 was supported and signed by all the 
European Union members,
56
 it never came into effect because it was not 
ratified by all the member states.
57
 Despite this failure, the Luxembourg 
conference set the stage for the judicial system necessary for the 
community patent.
58
 
II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM: THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION 
As previously discussed, patents issued by the European Patent Office 
are issued as a ―bundle of national patents.‖59 While this ―bundle‖ in 
theory provides protection for the patent holder throughout Europe, such 
protection is meaningless without the ability to enforce the rights that 
come with a patent.  
 
 
French, and German as required by the European Patent Convention, Articles 14(7) and 97(5), the 
Community Patent Convention required the patentee to translate the patent claims into Danish, Italian 
and Dutch. Community Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 35, European Patent Convention, supra 
note 26, arts. 14(7), 97(5), rule 51(4). The costs associated with such translation requirements are often 
cited as the ―kiss of death‖ for the Community Patent Convention. See, e.g., Vincenzo Di Cataldo, 
From the European Patent to a Community Patent, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 19, 28 (2002). 
 53. PATERSON, supra note 51, at 21. At the time of this conference (1985), the European Union 
consisted of twelve member states. The History of the European Union, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/ 
abc/history/1980-1989/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). Since the signing of the Community 
Patent Convention, Greece, Portugal, and Spain joined the European Union. Id. 
 54. Pegram, supra note 19, at 596. 
 55. Agreement Relating to Community Patents, Dec. 15, 1989, 1989 O.J. (L 401) 1. 
 56. Pegram, supra note 19, at 596. 
 57. Id. All members of the European Union were required to ratify the agreement for it to come 
into force. Id. Only seven of the twelve members ratified the agreement. Id. The European Union’s 
failure to fully ratify the agreement is attributed in large part to the same problems the original 
Community Patent Convention had—―politically sensitive issues of language and jurisdiction.‖ 
RUDGE, supra note 37, § 6.2. 
 58. PATERSON, supra note 9, at 21. Early during the conference at Luxembourg, members of the 
European Union completed the Single European Act, with the general goal of more fully integrating 
the European market. Summary of the Single European Act, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/legislation_ 
summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_singleact_en.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). Paterson 
notes that the Single European Act ―enabled general recognition of the political problems [with the 
community patent] before the [other] objectives would be achieved.‖ Id.  
 59. See discussion supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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The Brussels Regulation
60
 governs a patent holder’s ability to enforce 
his or her rights under the European patent granted by the European Patent 
Office.
61
 Under the Brussels Regulation, the principal basis of jurisdiction 
is the defendant’s domicile.62 Thus, under Article 2(1) of the Brussels 
Regulation, if a defendant domiciled in France infringes a European patent 
in another European Union country, the patent holder must bring his 
patent infringement claim in France.
63
 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Regulation provides an additional forum 
for jurisdiction, allowing an infringement suit to be brought in the country 
where the infringement occurred.
64
 Thus, if the defendant in the above 
example infringed the patent in Germany, the patent holder could bring an 
infringement claim in either Germany or France. A national court 
exercising jurisdiction under Article 5(3), however, is limited to passing 
judgment only on acts of infringement that have occurred or are likely to 
occur within the country in which that court sits.
65
 Thus, if the patent 
holder from the above example were to bring his infringement suit in 
Germany, he could only sue for acts of infringement that took place within 
Germany. If the defendant had infringed that patent in more than one 
European Union country, the patent holder would have to sue in multiple 
countries if jurisdiction is based on Article 5(3).  
Under the law, patent holders can avoid multiple lawsuits by bringing 
the infringement claim in the country where the defendant is domiciled. A 
court which sits in the same country in which the defendant is domiciled 
can not only rule on acts of infringement which occur within that country, 
but also on acts of infringement which the defendant committed in other 
 
 
 60. Brussels Regulation, supra note 46. 
 61. The Brussels Regulation governs the allocation of jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in international disputes involving ―civil and commercial‖ matters. Brussels Regulation, 
supra note 46, art. 1(1). Thus, the Brussels Regulation governs patent infringement suits within the 
European Union. 
 62. The Brussels Convention provides: ―Subject to this regulation, persons domiciled in a 
Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.‖ Brussels 
Regulation, supra note 46, art. 2(1). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Article 5(3) of the Brussels Regulation states, in relevant part, ―A person domiciled in a 
Member State may, in another Member State, be sued . . . in matters relating to tort, delict, or quasi-
delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.‖ Id. art. 5(3). The 
phrase ―matters relating to tort, delict, and quasi-delict‖ has been interpreted to cover all actions 
seeking to establish the liability of the defendant and not related to contract matters under article 5(1) 
of the Brussels Regulation. See Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schroeder, Muenchmeyer, Hengst 
und Co., 1988 E.C.R. 05565 (interpreting the phrase ―matters relating to tort, delict, or quasi-delict‖ 
from Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement, Sept. 27, 1968). 
 65. Kalfelis, 1988 E.C.R. 05565. 
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countries within the European Union.
66
 Thus, in the above example, if the 
patent holder brought his infringement claim in France, where the 
defendant is domiciled, the French courts could hear claims for the acts of 
infringement which took place in Germany as well as those in France.  
In these types of infringement suits, however, the defendant can create 
a roadblock to the plaintiff’s recovery by challenging the validity of the 
patent at issue. Article 22(4) of the Brussels Regulation grants exclusive 
jurisdiction to the courts of the country that issued the patent in 
determining the validity of the patent.
67
 This requirement includes 
situations where the issue of validity is raised as a defense to an 
infringement suit.
68
 This jurisdictional requirement begs the question of 
which country is considered to have issued the patent when the patent is 
obtained through the European Patent Office?  
As previously discussed, European patents granted by the European 
Patent Office are issued as a ―bundle of national patents.‖69 Thus, each 
patent that comprises this ―bundle‖ is viewed as having been issued from a 
distinct country.
70
 For example, if the European Patent Office issues a 
patent which provides the patent holder rights in Germany, France, and 
Spain, the patent holder’s rights in France are governed by a French 
patent, his rights in Germany are governed by a German patent, and his 
 
 
 66. See Peter Hendrick & Bas Berghaus van Woortman, Confusion Over Cross-Border Decision, 
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Dec. 1, 2006), http://www.managingip.com/Article.aspx? 
ArticleID=1321264. 
 67. Article 22 provides:  
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction regardless of domicile: . . .  
. . . 
(4) in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, 
or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered, the courts of the Member State 
in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms 
of a Community instrument or an international convention deemed to have taken place. 
Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the European Patent Office under the Convention on 
the Grant of European Patents, . . . the courts of each Member State shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction, regardless of domicile, in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity 
of any European patent granted for that State.  
Brussels Regulation, supra note 46, art. 22(4). 
 68. Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und 
Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, 2006 E.C.R. I-06509, I-06531-32 [hereinafter GAT v. LuK]. Under 
the direct effects and supremacy doctrines, the GAT v. LuK decision is binding on the national courts 
of all European Union member states. See Stefan Enchelmaier, Supremacy and Direct Effect of 
European Community Law Reconsidered, or the Use and Abuse of Political Science for Jurisprudence, 
23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (2003). 
 69. See discussion supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 70. The term ―European patent‖ has been accurately described as ―nothing more than a subtly 
misleading term which serves as a moniker for the multiple . . . national patents.‖ Cataldo, supra note 
52, at 20. 
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rights in Spain are governed by a Spanish patent.
71
 Thus, the national 
courts of each country that issued the patent have exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine the validity of the patent within that country. Once the validity 
of the patent is challenged, the court presiding over the original 
infringement claim no longer has jurisdiction
72
 to resolve claims based on 
acts of infringement occurring outside of the country in which that court 
sits until the validity of the patent is determined.
73
 Because the validity of 
a patent is almost always challenged in a patent infringement suit,
74
 the 
result is often fragmented litigation in multiple countries across the 
European Union.
75
 
Aside from the monetary costs and additional time consumed by 
parallel litigation in multiple countries, another major problem with the 
European patent litigation system is that different national courts provide 
inconsistent results.
76
 A recent illustrative example of this problem arose 
out of a dispute between the European Central Bank and Document 
Security Systems (DSS), a U.S. company that originally brought a patent 
 
 
 71. This example is used only for illustrative purposes. Under the original European Patent 
Convention, the patent applicant had the responsibility to designate the countries in which protection 
was sought. European Patent Convention, supra note 26, art. 79. Thus, it was possible to obtain a 
patent from the European Patent Office which did not provide protection in every country that was a 
party to the European Patent Convention. Under the current version of the European Patent 
Convention, every country that is a party to the convention is, by default, ―deemed to be designated‖ 
as a country in which protection is sought. Amended European Patent Convention, supra note 39, art. 
79.  
 72. Article 25 of the Brussels Regulation states, ―Where a court of a Member State is seised of a 
claim which is principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of another Member State 
have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22, it shall declare of its own motion that it has no 
jurisdiction.‖ Brussels Regulation, supra note 46, art. 25. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. I-06509, I-6530 (―In practice . . . the issue of a patent's 
validity is frequently raised as a [defense] in an infringement action, the defendant seeking to have the 
claimant retroactively denied the right on which the claimant relies and thus have the action brought 
against him dismissed . . . .‖). 
 75. Despite the European Court of Justice’s decision in GAT v. LuK, some national courts have 
used Article 31 of the Brussels Regulation to grant preliminary injunctions having cross-border effects. 
See Bettacare Ltd./H3 Products B.V., Arrondissementsrechtbank [Rb.] (court of first instance), Hague, 
21 Sept. 2006, http://www.boek9.nl/getobject.php?id=2698. An English translation is available at 
http://www.ie-online.nl/backoffice/uploads/file/IEForum/Book9.nl/Bettacare%20vs_%20H3.pdf. Article 
31 of the Brussels Regulation states, ―Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for 
such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State, even 
if, under this Regulation, the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of 
the matter.‖ Brussels Regulation, supra note 46, art. 31. 
 76. RUDGE, supra note 37, § 6.1 (―Not only is this parallel litigation expensive, but the outcome 
also often varies from country to country, depending on the way the same claims and prior art are 
interpreted according to different legal traditions.”); see also GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA 
POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 221 (noting that ―common rules that are applied in similar, but not 
necessarily identical ways in all countries‖ and ―differentiated rights across countries‖). 
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infringement suit against the European Central Bank.
77
 After the Court of 
First Instance of the European Union declined to accept jurisdiction of 
DSS’s infringement claim,78 the European Central Bank filed a series of 
declaratory actions in national courts across the European Union, seeking 
a declaratory judgment that DSS’s patent was invalid.79 Among the 
countries where the European Central Bank sought cancellation of DSS’s 
patent were the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Spain, and Italy.
80
 To date, the patent has been 
invalidated in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Austria, yet 
upheld in Germany and the Netherlands.
81
 
III. RECENT ATTEMPTS TO MODIFY THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 
In the last decade, both the European Union and the member states of 
the European Patent Convention have pushed for new proposals and 
regulations aimed at remedying the problems with the European patent 
litigation system.
82
 The European Patent Litigation Agreement and the 
Unified Patent Litigation System represent the two dominant approaches 
that emerged.  
A. The European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA) 
Following the Community Patent Convention of 1975 and the 
subsequent attempt to resuscitate the Community Patent in 1989,
83
 it was 
clear that the creation of a centralized patent court with exclusive 
 
 
 77. See Emma Barraclough, Judge Calls for European Patent Litigation System, MANAGING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.managingip.com/Article/1895148/Judge-calls-
for-European-patent-litigation-system.html. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. The declaratory actions in Spain and Italy are still pending. The European Central Bank 
has appealed both decisions upholding the validity of the patent. The appeal decisions in Germany and 
the Netherlands are still pending. Under a community patent system, one finding of invalidity by any 
European Union member state would invalidate the patent throughout the entire European Union. See 
discussion supra Part II. In the United Kingdom Court of Appeals decision invalidating the patent, 
Lord Justice Jacobs opined that the dispute between the European Central Bank and DSS ―illustrates 
yet again the need for a one-stop patent shop.‖ European Central Bank v. Document Security Systems 
Inc., [2008] EWCA Civ 192, [2008] All ER (D) 277 (Mar). Specifically, Lord Justice Jacob called for 
a ―one-stop patent shop (with ground floor department for first instance and a first floor department for 
second instance) for those who have Europe-wide businesses.‖ Id. For another well-known, illustrative 
example of courts reaching differing results in identical cases, see Cataldo, supra note 52, discussing 
the ―Epilady cases.‖ 
 82. See Forrester, Killick & Dawes, supra note 5. 
 83. See discussion supra Part I. 
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jurisdiction over infringement and invalidity claims would solve many of 
the problems resulting from the fragmented nature of European patents.
84
 
The inability of the European Union to establish a community patent and 
the ―frustration engendered by such failure‖85 led the European Patent 
Organization to begin exploring a solution based on the already well-
established European Patent Convention.
86
 In 1999, the European Patent 
Organization created a Working Party on Litigation for the purpose of 
―harmonising patent litigation‖ throughout Europe.87 In furtherance of this 
purpose, the Working Party was directed to, among other things, ―present 
a draft text for an optional protocol to the [European Patent Convention] 
which . . . would commit its signatory states to an integrated judicial 
system, including uniform rules of procedure and a common appeal 
court.‖88 After several meetings and various proposals,89 the Working 
Party submitted a finalized proposal in 2003, known as the European 
Patent Litigation Agreement (―EPLA‖).90  
The primary goal of the EPLA was to improve the European patent 
system by making the European patent litigation system more efficient.
91
 
 
 
 84. See RUDGE, supra note 37, § 6.1. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.; see also GUELLEC & VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 1, at 223 
(describing the European Patent Organization’s proposals as ―complement[ing]‖ and ―expand[ing]‖ 
upon the European Patent Convention). 
 87. Intergovernmental Conference of the Member States of the European Patent Organisation on 
the Reform of the Patent System in Europe, 1999 OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE 
545, available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj_index_e.htm. In fact, the Intergovernmental 
Conference mandated two working parties—one for the purpose of harmonizing patent litigation, and 
one for the purpose of reducing translation-related costs. Id. at 546–48. The latter working party was 
chaired by France, Portugal, and Sweden. Id. at 546. The former, the Working Party on Litigation, was 
chaired by Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. Id. at 548. 
 88. Id. at 548. Such a protocol would apply only to the contracting states of the European Patent 
Convention that are willing to commit to the proposed integrated judicial system. RUDGE, supra note 
37, § 6.1. One advantage to this optional approach is that the terms of the integrated judicial system 
would be negotiated only by those European Patent Convention contracting states who are willing to 
move forward with such an approach. Id. 
 89. The Working Party met five times between October 2000 and November 2003. RUDGE, 
supra note 37, § 6.1. Draft proposals were prepared by Dutch Judge Jan Willems and the European 
Patent Organization acting as secretariat for the sub-group. Pegram, supra note 19, at 601. 
 90. Pegram, supra note 19, at 601. The bulk of the work done on the EPLA was performed by a 
sub-group of the Working Party on Litigation, created in October of 2000. EPO—European Patent 
Litigation Agreement, http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legislative-initiatives/epla.html (last updated 
Apr. 3, 2009). The sub-group was comprised of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Monaco, and Luxembourg. Id. 
 91. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT 
LITIGATION AGREEMENT ON LITIGATION OF EUROPEAN PATENTS 8 (2006), available at http:// 
documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/CFCE3624CD11025AC125795700511874/$File/im
pact_assessment_2006_02_v1_en.pdf [hereinafter EPLA ASSESSMENT]. Additional purposes of the 
EPLA are to ―enhance legal certainty and predictability by ensuring harmonised interpretation of the 
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To achieve this goal, the EPLA called for the creation of a new 
international organization, the European Patent Judiciary (―EPJ‖), to be 
comprised of the European Patent Court and an administrative 
committee.
92
 Additionally, the EPLA would establish a system of law 
applicable to European patents common to all states that are a party to the 
agreement.
93
 The proposed European Patent Court, which would consist of 
a court of first instance and a court of appeal,
94
 would have exclusive 
jurisdiction
95
 over actions involving the infringement and revocation of 
European patents.
96
 The Court of First Instance would consist of a Central 
Division, located at the seat of the EPJ,
97
 and one or more Regional 
Divisions, located in the various contracting states of the EPLA, based on 
the needs of the various contracting states.
98
 Decisions from the Court of 
First Instance would be appealable to a centralized Court of Appeal,
99
 
located at the seat of the EPJ.
100
 Both the Court of First Instance and the 
 
 
scope of protection conferred by a European patent and its validity,‖ and to ―significantly reduce the 
number of cases where multiple litigation is necessary to enforce a European patent and thus bring 
down the costs for all parties involved.‖ Id. at 8–9. 
 92. DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A EUROPEAN PATENT LITIGATION SYSTEM 
art. 3(2) (Feb. 16, 2004), available at http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/B3 
884BE403F0CD8FC125723D004ADD0A/$File/agreement_draft_en.pdf [hereinafter EPLA DRAFT 
AGREEMENT]. 
 93. Id. art. 2. This ―common law‖ is analogous to the Community Patent proposals from 1975 
and 1989—i.e., a European patent would receive the same treatment in all contracting states of the 
EPLA. Id.; see discussion supra Part I. 
 94. EPLA DRAFT AGREEMENT, art. 3(2)(a). 
 95. During a seven year transitional period, national courts of contracting states to the EPLA 
would retain jurisdiction parallel to that of the European Patent Court. Id. art. 85(1). Additionally, 
under the EPLA, national courts would retain jurisdiction to order provisional or protective measures 
as provided for by their national laws. Id. art. 45(1). National courts would also have jurisdiction to 
order the provisional seizure of goods as security for any damages, compensation, costs or any other 
payment resulting from proceedings before the European Patent Court. Id. art. 46(1). 
 96. Id. art. 41. Specifically, Article 41 provides, ―The Court of First Instance shall have civil 
jurisdiction in respect of: (a) any action for actual or threatened infringement or for a declaration of 
non-infringement of a European patent effective in one or more of the Contracting States; (b) any 
action or counterclaim for revocation of a European patent effective in one or more of the Contracting 
States; . . . (d) any other action concerning a European patent if and to the extent the parties have so 
agreed.‖ Id. 
 97. Id. art. 10. 
 98. See id.; Draft Statute of the European Patent Court, arts. 19, 20(1), available at http:// 
documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/885CCB85F5CC33ABC125723D004B15F9/$File/ 
statute_draft_en.pdf; see also RUDGE, supra note 37, § 6.1. 
 99. EPLA DRAFT AGREEMENT, supra note 92, art. 76(1). Decisions could be appealed based on 
the grounds that the facts of a case were not correctly established or that the law was not correctly 
applied. Id. art. 79. 
 100. Id. art. 11. In addition to hearing appeals from decisions of the Court of First Instance, the 
Court of Appeal would also act as the Facultative Advisory Committee, whose sole duty is to issue 
non-binding opinions on points of law concerning European or harmonized national patent law. Id. 
arts. 1(h), 83a, 83b.  
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Court of Appeal would be comprised of a panel of international 
technically and legally qualified judges.
101
 The drafters of the EPLA 
boasted numerous benefits for participating member states, including 
access to specialized courts,
102
 increased expertise,
103
 more fully 
developed precedent for national courts,
104
 and reduced litigation costs.
105
 
In addition to these numerous benefits, the EPLA has garnered support 
from judges,
106
 academia,
107
 expert groups,
108
 and practitioners.
109
  
Despite the numerous benefits and widespread support of the EPLA, 
the proposed draft has encountered several obstacles. Opponents of the 
EPLA argue that patent litigation costs would increase, rather than 
decrease, under the EPLA.
110
 Additionally, some of the ―important‖ 
contracting states of the European Patent Convention, most notably 
France, have insisted that the establishment of the EPLA occur through the 
 
 
 101. See Draft Statute of the European Patent Court, supra note 98, arts. 3, 4(1), 26(1), 27. Article 
26 specifically provides: ―[T]he Court of First Instance shall sit in panels comprising an odd number of 
judges. At least one of these shall be a technically qualified judge and at least two shall be legally 
qualified judges. The legally qualified judges shall be of at least two different nationalities.‖ Id. art. 
26(1). Article 26(1) applies mutatis mutandis to the Court of Appeal. Id. art. 27. The terms ―technically 
qualified‖ and ―legally qualified‖ are not defined in either the Draft Statute of the European Patent 
Court or the Draft Agreement on the Establishment of a European Patent Litigation System. See Draft 
Statute of the European Patent Court, supra note 98; EPLA DRAFT AGREEMENT, supra note 92. 
 102. EPLA ASSESSMENT, supra note 91, at 8. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 9. 
 106. See Resolution Passed by the Named Judges Specialising in Patent Law at the Judges’ Forum 
Held in San Servolo, Venice—October 14–16, 2005, available at http://www.eplaw.org/Downloads/ 
Venice%20Resolution.pdf (Twenty-four judges from ten different countries, all of which are member 
states of both the European Union and the European Patent Convention, supporting EPLA). 
 107. EPLA ASSESSMENT, supra note 91, at 9 n.9 (citing Mario Franzosi, A Community Patent: 
Three Suggestions for Two Difficulties, IIC 2004, 416 (419); Joseph Straus & Michael Schneider, 
Probleme des europäischen und internationalen Patentrechts, Tätigkeitsbericht 2004, Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft, 233). 
 108. EPLA ASSESSMENT, supra note 91, at 9 n.10 (citing CREATING AN INNOVATIVE EUROPE, 
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT EXPERT GROUP ON R&D AND INNOVATION (Jan. 2006) (following the 
Hampton Court Summit), available at http://www.eua.be/Libraries/Page_files/aho_report.sflb.ashx). 
 109. European Commission Public Hearing on Future Patent Policy in Europe, at 4 (July 12, 
2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/hearing/report_en.pdf. 
According to the report, the majority of practitioners supported the EPLA because it struck the ―right 
balance between simple access to courts (regional divisions) and legal certainty through centralization 
(second instance) . . . .‖ Id. Practitioners also cited the language regime and the specialized technical 
judges, which would provide high quality decisions, as reasons for supporting the EPLA. Id. 
 110. See Xavier Buffet-Delmas & Laura Morelli, Modifications to the European Patent System, 8 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 18, 21 (2008); Kerry J. Begley, Multinational Patent Enforcement: What 
the “Parochial” United States can Learn from Past and Present European Initiatives, 40 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 521, 559 (2007). 
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European Union.
111
 France has also raised constitutional and institutional 
compatibility concerns between the EPLA, the European Union, and the 
European Community treaties.
112
 However, the Working Party on 
Litigation never addressed these issues because work on the draft EPLA 
stopped in December of 2005.
113
 Since that time, work on an integrated 
judicial system has continued through the European Union.
114
 
B. The Unified Patent Litigation System (“UPLS”) 
The European Union had started work on a proposal similar to the 
EPLA in the late 1990s
115
 as a follow-up to the Lisbon Special European 
Council.
116
 In 1999, the European Commission
117
 began drafting a 
proposal for a regulation, as opposed to a convention,
118
 for the creation of 
 
 
 111. RUDGE, supra note 37, § 6.1. Specifically, France has insisted that the EPLA not be 
established as an extension of the European Patent Convention. Id. France, as well as other contracting 
states, takes the position that the European Court of Justice should have a role in European patent 
litigation. Id. If the EPLA were established as an international agreement, rather than a European 
Union initiative, the European Court of Justice would not have jurisdiction to hear infringement or 
invalidity suits as such jurisdiction would be vested in a separate international body, the European 
Patent Judiciary. See discussion supra Part II. 
 112. Begley, supra note 110, at 559. Specifically, ―France has highlighted constitutional concerns 
for the [European Union], arguing that it is unacceptable to create a non-[European Union] legal 
system with a non-[European Union] court.‖ Id. France has also raised ―concerns regarding possible 
contradictions between the EPLA’s proposed intergovernmental court and the judicial order 
established by European Community treaties.‖ Id. 
 113. EPO—European Patent Litigation Agreement, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo 
.org/patents/law/legislative-initiatives/epla.html (last updated Apr. 3, 2009). The Working Party on 
Litigation ceased work on the EPLA in light of the efforts of the European Union to establish a 
Community patent with a judicial system of its own. Id. According to the European Patent 
Organization’s website, the Working Party on Litigation recognized that ―the establishment of a 
litigation system for European patents has to be paused, in view of the work being done by the 
European Union to introduce a Community patent with a judicial system of its own.‖ Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. The Lisbon Special European Council ―outlined a ten year plan to make the [European 
Union] more competitive.‖ Community Patent, EURACTIV (Dec. 8, 2006), http://euractiv.com/en/ 
innovation/community-patent/article-117529. 
 117. The European Commission is a body of the European Union which proposes legislation for 
the European Union and ensures that such legislation is applied properly throughout the European 
Union. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, arts. 211–219, 1997 O.J. (C 
340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
 118. International conventions, like the European Patent Convention and the Community Patent 
Conventions of 1975 and 1989, are generally more difficult to negotiate and typically require a 
unanimous consensus among member states to amend the text of the convention. See Di Cataldo, 
supra note 52, at 22–23. The European Union opted for a convention on a community patent in the 
1970s and 1980s because it ―considered itself too weak‖ to enact a regulation on community patent 
law. Id. at 26. The European Union feared it would not be able to garner the political support if it 
issued a regulation on patent law. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
186 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:171 
 
 
 
 
a Community Patent system (―Proposal on Community Patent‖).119 The 
idea behind the Proposal on Community Patent was very similar to the 
Community Patent Convention of 1975 and the Agreement Relating to 
Community Patents of 1989 in that the proposed regulation sought to 
establish community-wide law on patents, applicable to all patents granted 
by the European Patent Office.
120
  
The Proposal on Community Patent provided a comprehensive body of 
law applicable to patents granted by the European Patent Office
121
 referred 
to as ―Community patents.‖122 The body of law provided in the Proposal 
on Community Patent was to be applied by a centralized court, referred to 
as the ―Community intellectual property court,‖123 which would have 
exclusive jurisdiction over infringement and invalidity claims.
124
 
In 2003, the Competitiveness Council
125
 reached an agreement on a 
―common political approach‖ for the adoption of such a centralized 
 
 
 119. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, Nov. 28, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 
337 E) 278 [hereinafter Proposal on Community Patent]. 
 120. Id. art. 1. Compare Proposal on Community Patent art. 2(1) (―The community patent shall 
have a unitary character . . . shall have equal effect throughout the Community and may only be 
granted, transferred, declared invalid or lapse in respect to the whole of the Community.‖), with 
Community Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 2(2) (―Community patents shall have a unitary 
character . . . [shall] have equal effect throughout the territories to which this Convention applies and 
may only be transferred or allowed to lapse in respect of the whole of such territories.‖). 
 121. See Proposal on Community Patent, supra note 119. 
 122. Id. art. 1. Under this proposal, the distinguishing characteristic between a Community patent 
and a European patent is the applicable body of law. European patents would still be subject to the 
laws of the nation in which the action was brought. On the other hand, the body of law provided in the 
Proposal on Community Patent would be the exclusive law applicable to Community patents. Id. 
Because the Proposal on Community Patent relied on the European Patent Office for the issuing of 
Community patents, all member states of the European Union would have to ―accede to the European 
Patent Convention.‖ Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision 
Conferring Jurisdiction on the Court of Justice in Disputes Relating to the Community Patent, at 4 
COM (2003) 827 final (Dec. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Proposal for Conferring Jurisdiction on Court of 
Justice]. 
 123. Proposal on Community Patent, supra note 119, art. 30. 
 124. ―The actions and claims referred to in paragraph 1 [i.e., invalidity and infringement claims, 
and counterclaims for invalidity] come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Community intellectual 
property court.‖ Id. art. 30(3). As discussed earlier, such a centralized court with exclusive jurisdiction 
would avoid the problems caused by national courts applying ―community law‖ inconsistently. See 
discussion supra Part II and note 91 and accompanying text. 
 125. The Competitiveness Council is a ―configuration‖ of the Council of the European Union, 
charged with the duty of ―ensuring an integrated approach to the enhancement of competitiveness and 
growth in Europe.‖ Competiveness Council, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, http://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/policies/council-configurations/competitiveness%lang=en (last visited June 10, 
2012). The Council of the European Union is the European Union’s legislative body, which exercises 
its legislative power in conjunction with the European Parliament. Frequently Asked Questions: 
Council of the European Union-European Council-Council of Europe, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/contacts/faq.aspx?lang=en& faqid=2 (last visited June 10, 
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court.
126
 Based on this common political approach, the European 
Commission presented two proposals in December 2003: the Proposal for 
Conferring Jurisdiction on the Court of Justice
127
 and the Proposal for 
Establishing Community Patent Court.
128
 The proposals outlined the 
details of a Community intellectual property court,
129
 referred to as the 
Community Patent Court.
130
 Under the two proposals, the European Court 
of Justice would be vested with exclusive jurisdiction over actions 
involving Community patents.
131
 These actions would be heard in the first 
instance by a ―judicial panel‖—the Community Patent Court.132 Decisions 
from the Community Patent Court would be appealable to a special patent 
appeal chamber within the Court of First Instance,
133
 made up of judges 
with expertise in patent law.
134
 Because decisions from the Community 
Patent Court would be effective throughout the European Union,
135
 the 
―expense, inconvenience, and confusion‖ resulting from fragmented 
 
 
2012). A ―configuration‖ of the Council, such as the Competitiveness Council, is analogous to a 
committee or sub-committee of the United States Congress.  
 126. Results of the Competitiveness Council of Ministers, Brussels, 3rd March 2003, EUROPA 
(Mar. 4, 2003), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/03/47&format= 
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 127. See Proposal for Conferring Jurisdiction of Court of Justice, supra note 122. 
 128. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision Establishing 
the Community Patent Court and Concerning Appeals before the Court of First Instance, COM (2003) 
828 final (Dec. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Proposal for Establishing Community Patent Court]. 
 129. See id.; Proposal for Conferring Jurisdiction on Court of Justice, supra note 122. 
 130. See Proposal for Establishing Community Patent Court, supra note 128. 
 131. See Proposal for Conferring Jurisdiction on Court of Justice, supra note 122, art 1. 
Specifically, the Court of Justice would have exclusive jurisdiction over:  
(a) infringement or validity of a Community patent . . .; (b) the use of the invention after the 
publication of the Community patent application or the right based on prior use of the 
invention; (c) interim and evidence-protection measures in connection with the subject 
matters conferred; (d) damages or compensation in the circumstances set out in points (a), (b), 
and (c); (e) the ordering of a penalty payment in case of non-compliance with a decision or 
order constituting an obligation to act or to abstain from an act.  
Id. 
 132. Proposal for Establishing Community Patent Court, supra note 128, at 6–7. Under Article 
225a of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, the European Council can create judicial 
panels which can hear and decide certain classes of cases in the first instance. See EC Treaty, supra 
note 117, art. 225a. However, the conditions for establishing such a judicial panel are stringent—―The 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament and the Court of Justice or at the request of the Court of Justice and after consulting the 
European Parliament and the Commission, may create judicial panels to hear and determine at first 
instance certain classes of action or proceeding brought in specific areas.‖ Id. 
 133. Proposal for Establishing Community Patent Court, supra note 128, at 9. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Industrial Property: Commission Proposes Establishing Community Patent Court, EUROPA 
(Feb. 2, 2004), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/137&format=HTML& 
aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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litigation would be avoided.
136
 Despite these promising advantages, 
disagreement over the extent and legal effect of translations prevented a 
consensus on the proposals.
137
 
Notwithstanding these setbacks, the European Commission again set 
out to establish a unified patent litigation system in 2006.
138
 The European 
Commission performed a public consultation, receiving input from 
industry professionals and practitioners as to their views on future patent 
policy in Europe.
139
 The results of the consultation showed that a majority 
of the respondents favored the Community Patent approach set forth under 
the Community Patent Proposal.
140
 The consultation, however, also 
showed that a large majority of respondents supported the unified 
litigation system under the EPLA, rather than the Community Patent Court 
proposed by the European Commission in 2003.
141
  
In light of these findings, the European Commission suggested a 
European Union-wide jurisdictional system for patent litigation that would 
have jurisdiction over both European patents and Community patents.
142
 
Such a system, which later became known as the UPLS,
143
 would integrate 
features from both the earlier proposed Community Patent Court and the 
EPLA’s European Patent Court.144 In March 2009, the European 
Commission prepared a draft agreement for the UPLS and formally 
recommended that the Council of the European Union provide the 
European Commission with negotiating directives such that the European 
Commission could conclude an agreement creating the UPLS.
145
 Shortly 
 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Begley, supra note 110, at 556. 
 138. Press Release, European Comm’n, Patents: Comm’n Sets out Vision for Improving Patent 
System in Europe (Apr. 3, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference 
=IP/07/463&type=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr. 
 139. Id. 
 140. European Commission Public Hearing on Future Patent Policy in Europe, supra note 109, at 
4–5. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Communication from Commission to the European Parliament and the Council—Enhancing 
the Patent System in Europe, at 10–11, COM (2007) 165 final (Apr. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Commission 
Communication], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007: 
0165:FIN:en:PDF. 
 143. Press Release, European Comm’n, Patents: Comm’n Sets Out Next Steps for Creation of 
Unified Patent Litigation System (Mar. 24, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases 
Action.do?reference=IP/09/460&type=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr. Recently, the 
UPLS has increasingly been referred to as the European and European Union Patents Court (EEUPC). 
See European Patent Office—Unitary Patent/EU Patent, http://www.epo.org/law-practice/ legislative-
initiatives/eu-patent.html (last updated July 28, 2011). 
 144. Commission Communication, supra note 142, at 10–11. 
 145. Press Release, supra note 143. 
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thereafter,
146
 the Council of the European Union filed a request for an 
opinion by the European Court of Justice on the compatibility of the UPLS 
with European Union law.
147
  
In July 2010, the Advocates General (―AG‖) of the European Court of 
Justice issued an opinion to the court that the draft agreement of the UPLS 
was incompatible with European Union treaties: ―[a]s it stands at present, 
the envisaged agreement creating a unified patent litigation system is 
incompatible with the treaties.‖148 The AG cited several reasons why the 
draft agreement was incompatible with European Union treaties,
149
 most 
notably that the language regime of the draft agreement would be 
incompatible with rights of a defendant, ―as proceedings could be 
conducted against a defendant in a language which would be neither that 
of its country of origin nor of the country where it carries out its 
commercial activities.‖150 
On March 8, 2011, the European Court of Justice issued its opinion on 
the draft agreement of the UPLS.
151
 In addition to the concerns raised by 
the AG, the March 8 opinion noted that the draft agreement of the UPLS 
would ―deprive courts of Member States of their powers in relation to the 
interpretation and application of European Union law . . . .‖152 Ultimately, 
the European Court of Justice adopted the position of the AG, finding the 
 
 
 146. It is not clear exactly when the Council of the European Union filed the request. Compare 
Pegram, supra note 19, at 603 (stating the Council filed the request in July 2009), with Forrester, 
Killick & Dawes, supra note 5 (stating the Council filed the request in April 2009). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Forrester, Killick & Dawes, supra note 5. The Advocates General (―AG‖), comprised of 
eight members, assist the European Court of Justice in disposing of the cases that come before it. See 
Presentation, COURT OF JUSTICE, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/ (last visited Feb. 17, 
2011). The AG present opinions to the European Court of Justice and, although these opinions are not 
binding, they are generally followed by the Court. Id. 
 149. Forrester, Killick & Dawes, supra note 5. The reasons why the AG believed the draft of the 
UPLS was inconsistent with European Union treaties include:  
the draft agreement does not make clear that the patent court would be required to take into 
account, in its judgments, the EU Treaties, the fundamental rights and general principles 
guaranteed by EU law, and relevant secondary EU legislation. . . . The draft agreement does 
not refer to the primacy of the EU Treaties over international agreements and secondary EU 
law. . . . The draft agreement does not provide sufficient remedies in cases where the future 
patent court were either to infringe its obligation to make a reference to the [European Court 
of Justice] or were to breach its obligation to observe EU law. 
Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Opinion Avis 1/09, Draft agreement—Creation of a unified patent litigation system—
European and Community Patents Court—Compatibility of the draft agreement with the Treaties 
(Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=1/0& 
td=ALL&dates=%2524type%253Dpro%2524mode%253Don%2524on%253D2011.03.08.  
 152. Id. ¶ 89. 
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current draft of the UPLS to be incompatible with European Union 
treaties.
153
 
IV. MOVING FORWARD: THE BEST APPROACH TO A UNIFIED PATENT 
LITIGATION SYSTEM 
In analyzing the best route to a unified litigation system, it is important 
to note at the outset that the question is not what needs to be done, but 
rather, how it needs to be done. Both the EPLA and the most recent draft 
of the UPLS illustrate that the best solution to a unified patent litigation 
system in Europe is to establish a centralized court with exclusive 
jurisdiction over infringement and invalidity claims. Thus, the question 
becomes how should European nations go about establishing such a 
centralized court?  
In light of the recent opinion from the European Court of Justice, the 
EPLA is the most promising approach for a future unified patent litigation 
system throughout Europe since the opinion likely marks the end of the 
UPLS. One of the biggest issues raised by the opinion was that the 
language regime of the UPLS was inconsistent with European Union 
treaties.
154
 In order to make the draft agreement of the UPLS compatible 
with European Union treaties, the European Commission would likely 
have to reinsert the translation provisions which made the 2003 proposal 
of the Community Patent Court so undesirable.
155
 Thus, given the 
European Court of Justice’s recent opinion, making the UPLS compatible 
with European Union treaties is a formidable task. 
On the other hand, the approach taken by the EPLA avoids the 
conflicts caused by the UPLS. Because the EPLA would be adopted as an 
international agreement, the EPLA does not need to comport with 
European Union law. This point is particularly relevant in light of the 
European Commission’s prior suggestion that involvement of the 
European Union was required for member states of the European Union to 
enact the EPLA because it ―touches on subjects which are already covered 
by EC legislation.‖156 In their opinion, the AG expressed a contradictory 
opinion, stating that EU law is not opposed to an ―international agreement 
providing for its own judicial system . . . .‖157 Thus, contrary to the 
 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. See discussion supra Part III. 
 155. See discussion supra Part I.  
 156. Commission Communication, supra note 142, at 9–10. 
 157. JOCHEN PAGENBERG, INT’L ASS’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP., REPORT 
OF COMMITTEE Q 165: OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE EPC WITH REGARD TO LITIGATION CONCERNING 
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suggestion of the European Commission, the member states of the 
European Union are competent to enter into an international agreement 
such as the EPLA. Similarly, the constitutional and incompatibility 
concerns raised by France would be a non-issue if the EPLA were 
implemented through an international agreement. In fact, the problems 
raised by France only arise as a result of implementing the EPLA through 
the European Union, which is what France, as well as several other 
contracting states of the European Patent Convention, insisted upon.
158
 
Additionally, the EPLA would likely be a more cost-effective approach 
to a unified patent litigation system than the UPLS. Some opponents of the 
EPLA have suggested that implementing the EPLA would actually 
increase, rather than decrease, patent litigation costs.
159
 However, the 
EPLA merely provides an alternative forum for patent litigation. Potential 
plaintiffs would only bring a claim under the EPLA if it was more cost 
effective than filing the claim in a national court. Therefore, at worst, the 
EPLA would have no effect on the current costs of patent litigation. 
Additionally, the most recent assessment suggests that the EPLA would in 
fact decrease litigation costs.
160
 Thus, suggestions that the EPLA would 
increase litigation costs are unsupported by the most recent estimates as 
well as the optional judicial forum provided by the EPLA. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In light of the recent opinions of the AG and the European Court of 
Justice on the draft agreement of the UPLS, the eventual implementation 
of the UPLS is highly unlikely. Even if the current draft agreement was 
amended such that it was compatible with European Union treaties, the 
resulting translation costs would make such an option unattractive from a 
 
 
EUROPEAN PATENTS 5 (2010) [hereinafter AIPPA REPORT] (referencing the Opinion Avis 1/09, supra 
note 151, ¶ 58). The AG’s opinion specifically provides:  
With regard to the legality of creating the [Patent Court] as an international court, situated 
outside the judicial system of the European Union and enjoying sole competence for certain 
types of appeal, one should first recall that Union law is not in principle opposed to an 
international agreement providing for its own judicial system . . . . 
AIPPA REPORT, at 5. The AG opinion went on to cite an earlier opinion of the European Court of 
Justice which provides support for this position. Id. at 6. 
 158. See discussion supra Part III. 
 159. See discussion supra Part III. 
 160. EPLA Assessment, supra note 91, at 10–12 (2006). Specifically, the Assessment estimates 
that litigation of a medium-scale patent case would be more cost-effective in the European Patent 
Court as compared to parallel litigation before two or more national courts. Id. Similar reports on the 
UPLS indicate that the predicted costs resulting from implementing the UPLS are ―unrealistic‖ and 
would in fact be much higher than those previously published. AIPPA Report, supra note 157, at 2–3. 
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practical standpoint. Rather, the EPLA represents the best approach to a 
future unified patent litigation system throughout Europe. As an 
international agreement, the EPLA avoids many of the problems 
encountered by the UPLS and would likely result in a more cost efficient 
litigation system than the UPLA. The draft EPLA, therefore, represents the 
better starting point as European nations move towards a unified patent 
litigation system. 
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